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Abstract
This paper studies the response of firms in an environment with heightened idiosyn-
cratic risk and dual labor markets, a regular market with firing rigidity and a frictionless
temporary labor market. I find that firing rigidity induces firms to switch from regular
employment to temporary employment, and heightened risks amplify such behavior.
Efficiency and welfare loss from friction and risk, though alleviated by a small extent,
cannot be fully compensated by having temporary employment. This study also first
extends the literature of temporary employment by examining its impact in the U.S.
labor market.
JEL classification: E24, C68, J30.
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1 Introduction
Many studies have recognized the importance of non-convex cost in factor adjustment
(Khan and Thomas, 2003; Hamermesh, 1993; Cooper and Willis, 2001; Hall, 2002); few
has quantitatively examined it in a complex labor market, especially with its impact on
households’ welfare. This study quantitatively investigates the interactive consequences of
non-convex labor adjustment cost and dual labor markets with changing idiosyncratic risk,
where firms have imperfect substitutability between regular employment (or non-temporary
employment) that subjects to the non-convex cost and temporary employment that are free
of non-convex cost. I calibrate the benchmark model to the U.S. economy with temporary
employment and firing friction (mode of non-convexity in this study), and examine the pro-
duction efficiency and welfare consequences of having temporary employment while changing
the scale of the non-convexity and the level of idiosyncratic risk.
Though temporary employment contributes to a small share of the average employment
in the U.S. labor market, it is growing exponentially for the last two decades. Temporary
employment exhibits strong cyclicality, and significant leading behavior in recent recessions
and recoveries in the U.S.. Nevertheless, few research documents and evaluates its role in
the U.S. labor market. Only a handful of quantitative studies on temporary employment,
yet exclusively focus on European labor markets with high rigidities, of which results cannot
be directly applied to the U.S., because of a relatively laissez faire employment environment
in the U.S. (Wachter and Estlund, 2012; Lin, 2016; OECD, 2013). This paper takes an
initiative to fill the gap.
Studies on temporary employment often exclusively falls in the examination of it with
some level of firing cost induced labor rigidity. In addition, I introduce an interaction of id-
iosyncratic risk change with firing rigidity. I extend the job turnover model from Hopenhayn
and Rogerson (1993), and develop a heterogeneous firm model that allows for a simple but
effective structure in accounting for changes of idiosyncratic risk, labor market frictions and
different nature of employment costs. I employ two labor choices: non-temporary workers
and temporary workers. To model the nature of temporary employment in comparison to
regular employment, I abstract it by restricting firms to pay a firing cost if reducing regular
employment stock, while free for adjusting temporary workers. I calibrate the model to
match the U.S. economy. Temporary employment is, by definition, inexpensive and flexible.
According to the U.S. Department of Labor (2015), temporary contracts are designed to last
within one year, and/or to fulfill a temporary hike of demand. Firms are not obligated to of-
fer the same employment fringe benefits to temporary workers as to permanent workers, and
are not subject to firing and hiring related fixed expense to adjust the size of temporary em-
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ployment. Thus, segmenting labor market into temporary and non-temporary employments
endogenously generates asymmetry in the cost bearing to firms. In the U.S. labor market,
notwithstanding, we do not observe significant level of rigidities. Except for the Worker Ad-
justment and Retraining Notification Act (WARN) passed in 1980s, employers in the U.S.
can largely adjust labor force based on ”at-will” employment (OECD, 2013; Wachter and
Estlund, 2012). Despite so, we still observe an increase in the share of temporary employ-
ment from less than 0.3% in 1975 to about 2.5% in 2015 in the labor market. Labor market
rigidity alone is not a satisfying environment for the study of temporary employment in the
U.S. labor market. Empirical documents suggest that firms use temporary employment as a
buffer strategy (Schreft and Singh, 2003; Schreft, Singh, and Hodgson, 2005). In particular,
firms prefer to hiring and firing temporary workers in an environment with large uncertainty
before committing to a permanent hiring. Comin and Philippon (2006) provides empirical
background for this study by documenting a continuing increase of idiosyncratic firm level
volatility since the beginning of the Great Moderation. This paper is the first one to quan-
titatively study an economy with temporary employment in the background of increasing
idiosyncratic volatility of firms.
I show that capturing heterogeneity in a general equilibrium framework is crucial when
there is endogenously generated asymmetries, as supported by Restuccia and Rogerson (2013,
2008). Relative prices faced by different producers matter. Policy regulations on fixed cost
generate unbalanced responses in labor market. Thus, it is important to study the welfare
consequences in a general equilibrium framework with heterogeneous agents.
The introduction of temporary employment alleviates the efficiency loss from firing tax,
but does not fully serve as if a firing tax reduction. The introduction of firing cost leads
to firms’ inaction of adjusting permanent regular labor freely. The size of inaction band
represents the degree of labor market misallocation. The higher the firing cost, the larger
such inaction band is. With the introduction of temporary employment, firms turn further
away from the willingness to adjust regular workers and move to temporary workers as a
buffer strategy in avoiding firing cost.
By raising idiosyncratic uncertainty, the model responds with heightened market activity
as increasing job turnovers. But uncertainty alone cannot change employment composition
in a frictionless economy, since it does not distort firms’ marginal rate of substitution between
temporary and non-temporary labor inputs. If combining a small level of fixed cost to regular
employment with the raise of idiosyncratic uncertainty, however, firms respond sharply by
doubling the amount of temporary workers from just having a fixed cost. Compared to a
model without temporary employment, firms reduce labor market activities, and decrease
job turnovers in the environment with dual labor markets. Raising uncertainty, in addition
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to fixed cost, generates a larger inaction band, compared to the response in a model without
temporary employment. It further illustrates the significant role of temporary employment
as a buffer strategy for firms to avoid paying fixed cost in rising risk.
Fixed cost and high idiosyncratic volatility create large welfare loss to both firms and
households regardless of temporary employment. But having temporary employment slightly
relieves the loss. First of all, the fixed cost reduces labor market efficiency. Firms hoard
excess employees in facing low productivity and refrain from hiring on the other hand. Lower
efficiency reduces labor productivity and incurs output cost. Secondly, heightened idiosyn-
cratic risk reduces output. Thirdly, both labor market frictions and rising risk create welfare
loss for households, because of reduction of consumption and adjustment in labor supply.
Though having temporary employment reduces the welfare loss for firms and households, it
cannot reverse the labor market inefficiency created by fixed cost and increased risk. In other
words, temporary employment serves as a buffer strategy for firms to reduce misallocation
of labor and for households to buffer from substituting completely to unemployment.
There is only a small literature on temporary employment with inconclusive results, albeit
all about European labor markets. Booth, Francesconi, and Frank (2002), da Silva, Turrini,
et al. (2015), and Holmlund and Storrie (2002) give evidence that temporary jobs are less
desirable with lower wage rate. Boeri (1999) shows that market with temporary employment
serves against unemployed workers. Houseman and Heinrich (2015); Autor and Houseman
(2010); Kilcoyne (2005); Peck and Theodore (2007); Melchionno (1999) look at the U.S. labor
market and documents similar facts. Gu¨ell (2000) uses an efficiency wage model and argues
for a negative welfare consequences of temporary employment. Other mainstream studies
involve partial equilibrium frameworks. Aguirregabiria and Alonso-Borrego (2014) argue
that increasing temporary employment reduces labor market misallocation, similar to a re-
duction of firing tax. Bentolila and Saint-Paul (1992) and Cabrales and Hopenhayn (1997)
acknowledge that temporary employment increases total employment in economic booming
and dampens business cycle fluctuations in aggregate employment. Search models are also
frequently used. Many of such work argue that temporary employment increases unem-
ployment and have negative welfare consequences (Blanchard and Landier, 2002; Cahuc and
Postel-Vinay, 2002). On the other hand, Faccini (2014) further introduces firm’s screening
motive in utilizing temporary employment, and generates positive welfare and a perma-
nent decrease of unemployment. Seliski (2015) and Blanchard and Landier (2002) provide
counter-argument that temporary employment prevents workers from transitioning to high
paid stable permanent jobs, which creates life-time welfare loss. These studies, however,
often exogenously fix the relative ratio of temporary workers to regular workers in the la-
bor force, and does not allow endogenous movement for workers and firms to adjust such
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ratio. Alvarez and Veracierto (2006) and Veracierto (2000) incorporate undirected search
in a Lucas-Island environment and show that the size and length of temporary contracts
matter. Alonso-Borrego, Ferna´ndez-Villaverde, and Galdo´n-Sa´nchez (2005) extend such hy-
brid model with complex features in an incomplete market, and conclude that temporary
employment increases unemployment and reduce output.
2 Stylized facts
There are few literature documenting the stylized facts of temporary employment in
the U.S. labor market. Given its small share in the labor force, there is also a lack of
systematic and comprehensive aggregate data record for temporary employment. Following
the practice by Schreft et al. (2005), Schreft and Singh (2003), Melchionno (1999), and
Kilcoyne (2005), I use Current Establishment Survey from Bureau of Labor Statistics to
document related facts. Specifically, I use employment data from Personnel Supply Services
for an approximation of temporary employment from 1972 to 1990, and Temporary Help
Services from the Employment Services category for data since 1990. These categories collect
data from companies that supply temporary workers to other firms. Such data overestimate
the temporary employment by counting non-temporary staff members in the service agencies,
and underestimate independent contractors and temporary employees hired directly by each
firm. Schreft and Singh (2003) argue that the overestimation should be small; Kilcoyne
(2005) argue that temporary help services account for more than 70% of total temporary
employment. Given it the best aggregate data available, I proceed with caution.
It is triking to see the rate of growth of temporary employment in the U.S. Figure 1 plots
the average share of temporary employment using monthly data from 1972 to 2015. Despite
of its small share, it grew from about a quarter percent of total employment in 1972 to about
3% in 2000. With big fluctuations in the recent two recessions, it is still catching up to over
2.5% in 2015.
I take natural log of the data and bandpass-filtered each series to remove fluctuations
higher than 18 months (Christiano and Fitzgerald, 2003). Figure 2 plots the time series
of log-detrended data for temporary employment, nontemporary employment, total employ-
ment and GDP. Given the dominant share of non-temporary employment, it almost replicates
total employment. Throughout history, we observe large cyclical flucuations of temporary
employment. Table 1 further documents the volatility and cyclicality of temporary employ-
ment to GDP (in comparison to total employment). GDP has a standard deviation of 0.015.
Temporary employment is four times as volatile as GDP; while the standard deviation of
total employment is only 80% of GDP.
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Figure 1: Share of temporary employment
Table 1: Volatility of temporary employment
output total employment temporary employment
Std to Output (0.015) 0.814 4.096
contemporaneous correlation to output 0.701 0.774
1st order autocorrelation 0.876 0.945 0.932
2nd order autocorrelation 0.693 0.793 0.747
Note: Std to output at the first column is just the standard deviation of output.
It is natural to project such high volatility from the quality of temporary employment,
inexpensive to fire. Though it is not the focus of the quantitative practice of this paper,
Table 2 documents some important behavior of temporary employment in recent business
cycles. Temporary employment in general leads total employment change in both recession
and recovery by more than one month. Such leading pattern is becoming more significant
in recent recessions, with the increasing share of temporary employment. During the initial
job loss and job recovery, temporary employment, despite being small in share of total
employment, accounts for a significant portion of total job loss and total job gain.
With the extremely high volatility and fast growing pattern, as well as its role in the
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Table 2: Temporary employment in business cycles
1975 1980** 1982 1991 2001*** 2009
Recession total emp drop 1.62% 1.06% 3.08% 1.14% 1.19% 5.34%
total temp drop 12.60% 5.93% 12.84% 5.57% 11.10% 29.71%
total drop accounted
by temp
2.61% 3.32% 2.38% 6.82% 25.64% 13.73%
months before trough
total starts to drop
12 11 16 9 10 14
months temp
preceeds total to drop
1 -1 0 1 5 14
Recovery* total gain 6.19% 1.96% 8.11% 1.31% 0.41% 0.71%
temp gain 45.41% 15.94% 59.96% 23.41% 7.04% 21.27%
total gain accounted
by temp
2.19% 4.59% 4.35% 23.84% 42.22% 54.99%
months started to
recover from trough
5 2 2 7 25 4
months temp preceeds
total to recover
1 1 2 2 8 3
Note: *recover compares employment level 24 months after trough date to trough level; **1980
recovery compares employment level at June 1981 to trough date; ***2001 recovery compares
employment level 30 months after trough date to trough date level.
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Figure 2: Business cycle fluctuations
business cycle, it is important to evaluate at temporary employment in the U.S. labor market.
3 Model
To explore the impact of fixed term contract on the economy, I build a dynamic general
equilibrium model with heterogeneous firms and a representative household. The model ex-
tends from Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993), with a main feature incorporating two different
labor factors: temporary labor and non-temporary labor. The main difference of the two
types of labor comes from the difference in labor productivity and the fixed cost. Every
period, if a firm decides to reduce the stock of non-temporary employees, it pays a cost,
indexed to the wage rate. A firm is free to adjust temporary employees without such fixed
cost.
3.1 Firm’s Problem
The economy is populated by infinitely lived firms with their total mass summing up to
one. There is no entry or exit in the economy. The only input to production is the two types
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of labor, n1 and n2, with n1 being non-temporary regular labor, and n2 being temporary
labor. I assume firms having a CES production function with decreasing returns to scale.
Therefore, the period production function has the following format:
f(n1, n2) = (λn
γ
1 + (1− λ)nγ2)(α/γ) (1)
In the model, non-temporary employment is an idiosyncratic endogenous state variable. At
the beginning of every period before production, each firm decides to increase, decrease, or
intact the current stock of non-temporary employees. If a worker is hired to be an non-
temporary worker, her contract lasts indefinitely to the future, unless fired by the firm.
Temporary employment, on the contrary, is indexed to each period. Firms hire n2 number
of temporary workers at the beginning of each period before production, and their contracts
end by the end of the period. The firm needs to hire them again as a new contract if it needs
temporary workers the next period.
To capture the essential difference of temporary and non-temporary workers, I assume
firms pay a fixed firing cost at coefficient τ as a percentage of the wage rate, if it reduces the
size of non-temporary workers. Firms pay no fixed cost for reducing the size of temporary
workers. Such firing cost is an abstract of a variety of rigidities in regular employment
compared to temporary employment. Garibaldi and Violante (2005) define firing cost as
a combination of transfers between the employer and the laid-off worker and outside of
employer-employee pair as a form of tax. In European labor market, τ largely represents
the level of employment protection legislation (as a firing tax). Though there is minimum
employment protection legislation in the U.S. labor market, it hardly means a lack of labor
market frictions. Compared to temporary employment, τ represents non-legislative frictions,
such as severance pay, unemployment insurance, cost of emotions in the workforce, cost of
reorganization to a permanent position, etc. The firing cost is modeled as:
g(n1, n
′
1) = τw1(n1 − n′1), if n1 > n′1 (2)
Every period, each firm draws an idiosyncratic productivity shock s before production,
and the firm observes s from a standard log-normal AR(1) process before making current
period employment decisions1. In summary, each firm earns period profit:
Π = sf(n′1, n2)− w1n′1 − w2n2 − g(n1, n′1) (3)
In a dynamic environment, firms discount future value by factor βf . We can write firms’
1 ln s′ = ρ ln s+ , where  ∼ N(0, σe)
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problem as:
W (s, n1;µ) = max{Wd(s, n1;µ),Wu(s, n1;µ)} (4)
Each firm chooses whether to downsize the level of non-temporary employment or up-size
it. The value of a downsizing firm has:
Wd(s, n1;µ) = max
n′1,n2
{sf(n′1, n2)− w1n′1 − w2n2 − τw1(n1 − n′1)
+βfEsW (s
′, n′1;µ
′)}
(5)
And the value of an up-sizing/inaction firm has:
Wu(s, n1;µ) = max
n′1,n2
{sf(n′1, n2)− w1n′1 − w2n2 + βfEsW (s′, n′1;µ′)} (6)
From the firm’s problem, we can define an individual firm’s inter-temporary decision rule
as:
n′1 = h(s, n1) (7)
And decision rule for hiring temporary employment:
n2 = ψ(n
′
1, s, µ) (8)
In a stationary equilibrium, although price doesn’t change, firms face idiosyncratic produc-
tivity risk every period. There is constant up-sizing and downsizing in the model. I track the
distribution of firms on the size of non-temporary employment stock, n1, and the idiosyn-
cratic productivity shock, s, by the probability measure µ defined on the Borel Algebra, S,
generated by the open subsets of the product space, S = R+ × R+. Aggregate decision rule
µ evolves as:
µ′(s′, n′1) = Γ(µ(s, n1)) (9)
In aggregate, non-temporary labor demand has:
Ldn1(µ
′) =
∫
h(s, n′1)dµ
′ (10)
and temporary labor demand has:
Ldn2(µ
′) =
∫
ψ(s, n′1)dµ
′ (11)
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3.2 Household’s Problem
To simplify the model, I choose one representative household in the economy. The house-
hold is endowed with one unit of time deciding to supply temporary jobs and one unit of
time in supplying labor to non-temporary jobs. It values utility differently for the time from
temporary jobs and from non-temporary jobs. I assume log utility for household from con-
sumption and from leisure. Every period, the household chooses how many hours to allocate
to each type of job, and pools the wage earned from different jobs to enjoy consumption.
Household has period utility:
log(ct) + a log(1− n1t) + b log(1− n2t) (12)
The household owns the firms, hence receives profit rebate Π, as well as government tax
rebate Υ in a lump sum every period. I do not explicitly model asset in the model. By
setting discounting factor β = 1
1+r
, the household’s decision becomes static in a stationary
equilibrium.
Following Hansen (1985) and Rogerson (1988), I assume indivisible labor. Therefore, the
household acts as if choosing the share of its members supplying to temporary jobs and the
share to non-temporary jobs. We have the household’s problem as:
U(C, 1−N1, 1−N2) = max
C,N1,N2
{log(C) + a log(1−N1) + b log(1−N2)}
s.t.
C ≤ w1N1 + w2N2 + Π + Υ
(13)
3.3 Equilibrium
With the above definitions, the stationary competitive equilibrium of this economy should
have a consistency between firm’s choice and household’s optimality conditions, cleared by
the price. More formally, the recursive equilibrium is a set of functions for prices, quantities,
and values:
{w1, w2, r, n′1f , n2f , Ldn1 , Ldn2 , n1h, n2h, N1, N2, c, C, Y,W,U} (14)
1. Firms maximize W for Equation (4) with n′1f and n2f their associated policy functions.
2. The household maximizes U for Equation (13) with n1h, n2h, and c its associated policy
functions.
3. Prices w1, w2, r are competitively determined (I set r = 1/β − 1 without loss of gener-
ality).
4. Markets for two labors and final goods clear.
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5. Laws of motion for aggregate state variables are consistent with individual decisions.
As there is no heterogeneity in household, its consumption and labor supply decisions can
be written as a function of aggregate state: C(µ), N1(µ), and N2(µ).
4 Calibration
Despite the growing importance of temporary employment in the U.S. labor market,
there has been no research quantitatively assess its role in the U.S. economy. With limited
micro observations, it is also difficult to find data reporting details of temporary employment
across U.S. firms. Therefore, I rely certain calibration targets on reports and empirical work
done on temporary employment in the U.S. as a rough baseline for the benchmark model
estimation.
In this economy, I choose model period to be one year. It is consistent with the U.S.
Department of Labor (2015) definition of temporary contracts being within one year. Due to
the model setup, I cannot account for the quits and firings of temporary workers within one
year. I set β equals to 0.96 in order to match the annual interest rate of 4%. The idiosyncratic
firm productivity follows a Markov Chain with 20 values. According to Hopenhayn and
Rogerson (1993), it is necessary to have such grid size for precision. I discretize the Markov
Chain using Tauchen (1986)’s method. Calibration for the idiosyncratic productivity shock
process, as dictated by ρ and σe, targets the average firm size distribution as reported by
the Longitudinal Business Database from 1977 - 2013.
Table 3: Benchmark Parameter Values
β λ γ α ρ σe τ a b
0.96 0.961 0.29 0.692 0.9791 0.259 0.6 1 1.1417
The essential qualities of temporary employment, being inexpensive and flexible, also
predict that temporary workers are in general less productive. Houseman and Heinrich
(2015), Autor and Houseman (2010), and Kilcoyne (2005) document that majority of the
U.S. temporary labor force are composed with low skilled workers. Houseman and Heinrich
(2015) provide further evidence that temporary workers tend to have lower soft skills and
have less trainings provided by the employers. Consequently, we often observe a lower wage
rate paid to temporary workers than to a non-temporary worker, even with the same job
responsibility. Albeit inexpensive to hire and fire while facing uncertainty, it becomes unclear
if hiring more temporary employees is beneficial.
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Traditional line of research following Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993), such as Veracierto
(2008) and Lin (2016), follows a path of calibration to a laissez-faire benchmark and applying
different values of τ for experiment. I calibrate the benchmark model, instead, with friction
according to the U.S. economy. This is also a realistic approach given the relatively low
and steady τ in U.S. labor market. For the purpose of this study, in the investigation of
changing idiosyncratic volatility, it is also more appropriate to have τ calibrated to the U.S.
economy. Firms are assumed to follow a standard decreasing return to scale CES production
function with two kinds of labor inputs. The scale of production α is calibrated to match the
average post-war labor share of output 0.64. According to Houseman and Heinrich (2015)
and Autor and Houseman (2010), majority of temporary employment in the U.S. are low
skilled workers. I approximate the elasticity of substitution 1/(1−γ) between temporary and
non-temporary labors using the value 1.4 from David, Katz, and Krueger (1997) between
low skilled and high skilled workers. As for the productivity efficiency parameter λ, I need
to match the marginal rate of transformation between the two types of labor to the wage
ratio and the average share of temporary employment in the U.S. data. Meanwhile, λ is
also jointly determined with the firing cost τ . Since firms with different size respond to
τ differently, changing τ also moves the distribution of firms. In addition, according to
Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993) and Atkenson, Khan, and Ohanian (1996), firing cost has
a close relationship to the job turnover rate. Therefore, I need to jointly calibrate the two
AR(1) parameters, τ , α, and λ.
Household’s parameters are much simpler in calibration. Since I do not model employ-
ment level in the economy, only the ratio of two disutility parameters matters. I normalize
a to be 1, and calibrate b to match the wage ratio of about 0.7 (Kilcoyne, 2005). Table 3
reports all the parameter values calibrated for the study.
To check for robustness of the calibration, Table 4 provides calibration targets and the
model generated values. Tail end of firms size distributions is less ideal in matching. Given
the simplicity of the model, it’s within reasonable range (Hopenhayn and Rogerson, 1993).
5 Analysis
With the benchmark model calibrated to the U.S. annual data, I was able to conduct
several experiments to study two changes, growing labor market rigidities and rising id-
iosyncratic risk, that may lead to an increase in temporary employment in the U.S., and to
examine the aggregate consequences from it.
Figure 3 documents the key mechanism that causes labor misallocation. It shows decision
rules at one idiosyncratic productivity level for three economies with difference in firing cost.
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Table 4: Robustness Check
Data Model
labor share of output 0.64 0.642
wage ratio 0.7 0.7
average share of temporary employment 0.0208 0.0201
job turnover 0.318 0.3002
firm size distribution
1-19 0.8559 0.8234
20-99 0.1201 0.1204
100-499 0.0212 0.0342
500-999 0.0017 0.0000
1000+ 0.001 0.022
The horizontal axis represents the current level of non-temporary employment, and the
vertical axis shows the next period level of non-temporary employment. In an economy
without firing cost, the decision rule is a horizontal line. Without capital, the most efficient
employment decision responds perfectly to the size of productivity shock, independent from
previous level of employment. Firms hire and fire depending only on the productivity level.
As we introduce a positive τ to the firm’s firing decision, it becomes costly to reduce the
size of employment. The firm has to consider current stock of employment before deciding
how many workers to keep next. In order to avoid paying such firing cost, firms refrain from
hiring even if there is a demand for labor, because of the fear of firing them the next period;
and hoard an excess of labor on the other hand.
Such behavior creates inefficiency. The mechanism produces an inverse ”Z-shape” inac-
tion band. The size of the band positively depends on the idiosyncratic shock value and the
level of the firing cost. If current employment is above the upper bound or below the lower
bound, (i.e. the horizontal tails of the inverse Z), the firm’s employment decision is (con-
ditionally) independent from the current level of employment. For the current employment
level within the upper and lower bounds, the number of employees to keep the next period
relies on current employment level. As we raise the size of firing cost, the size of inaction
band increases.
Compare the decision rules between model with temporary employment and without
temporary employment (only non-temp workers), the size of inaction band expands further.
This illustrates the ”buffer strategy” of firms’ using temporary employment. Allowing for
temporary employment gives firm a chance to adjust labor force, albeit to a lower productive
factor, in avoidance of paying the fixed cost. Thus, it creates a stronger incentive for firms
to avoid hiring and firing in non-temporary jobs.
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Figure 3: Decision rule and Inaction band
5.1 Firing cost and temporary employment
Most research on temporary employment establishes on a change of legal background.
The conclusions, however, are often quite conflicting. In this section, I conduct an experiment
by almost doubling the benchmark model firing related cost from 7.2 months to one year
of wage. According to Wachter and Estlund (2012), the increase of the U.S. labor market
regulations in late 1980s caused a doubling of labor market rigidities in all index documented.
Regardless, the size of firing cost is still quite small comparing to it in Italy that varies
between 1.5 years of wage and 3.4 years of wage (Garibaldi and Violante, 2005).
I report the general equilibrium results of increasing firing cost in Table 5. In the bench-
mark model, I calibrated the firing cost to be 7.2 months of wage (0.6w). Column 1 and
Column 3 show the results with zero firing cost and with a firing cost equals to one year of
wage rate, respectively. Though with such a simple model, we see strong and significant ef-
fects from the consequences of job reallocation. With higher firing cost, low productive firms
hoard too many workers, as represented by a decrease of job destruction rate (JDR); and
high productive firms are reluctant to hire, as indicated by a large decrease of job creation
rate (JCR) across Column 1 to Column 3. The average firm size is also decreasing (from
20% without firing cost to 88% with τ = 1). This is opposite from Hopenhayn and Rogerson
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(1993), because of elimination of entry and exit. Inefficiency created by firing cost with no
opportunity to exit leads to a large concentration of smaller firms, rather than dropping out
of the market.
In order to separate firms’ response from households’, I compare the results to partial
equilibrium results in Column (4) and (5) of Table 5. I fix the wage rates at benchmark level.
In the perfectly efficient model without firing cost, the share of temporary employment is
low (92% of Column (2) value). Firms prefer using non-temporary workers than temporary
workers, due to the difference of labor productivity. With an increase of firing cost, such
behavior flipped. Though firms reduce the level of employment for both temps and nontemps,
the share of non-temporary employment increases from 91.56% to 102.42%. This tells that
firms are willing to sacrifice labor productivity by hiring more temporary workers in order to
avoiding paying firing cost. Despite so, temporary employment cannot compensate the cost
of efficiency loss. Therefore, we see a drop of output and profit in both general equilibrium
and partial equilibrium results.
By including household’s preference, general equilibrium shows a more dampened impact
due to price adjustment. One difference, however, is the level of temporary employment. We
not only observe an increase in the share of temporary employment (from 94.6% to 101.5%),
but also in the level of temporary employment (from 97.9% to 100.7%). With the level of
distortion and inactivity in the market of non-temporary employment, households substitute
non-temporary labor supply to leisure and to temporary jobs; consequently, firms are able
to hire more temporary workers in general equilibrium than in partial equilibrium (100.68%
compared to 93.44%). Such comparisons also foretell the importance of considering general
equilibrium price effect in the study of welfare consequences.
To investigate how much including temporary employment in a model contributes to the
general equilibrium result, I compare the original model (dual-labor model from now on) to
a single-labor economy with only permanent employment. I keep everything else the same
but shutting down the option of hiring temporary workers. I recalibrate the production
parameters (essentially α) to make the single-labor economy producing the same level of
output as the dual-labor model at τ = 0. Table 6 reports results from the comparison.
After increasing firing cost from τ = 0 to τ = 1, both models show losses of labor
market activities and output. In particular, I calculate the welfare as the level of utility
enjoyed by households for each model. Increasing firing cost leads to a loss of households’
welfare. Comparing to the model without temporary employment, however, dual-labor model
compensates such welfare loss by a about 1.3%. In other words, having a market with
temporary employment reduces the welfare punishment from high firing cost to households.
Such improvement comes from both a lesser reduction of the output (to 95.25% from 93.92%)
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Table 5: Effect of firing cost
General Equilibrium Partial Equilibrium
τ = 0 τ = 0.6w τ = 1w τ = 0 τ = 1w
nontemp wage 107.51% 100.00% 97.68% 100.00% 100.00%
temp wage 104.97% 100.00% 98.17% 100.00% 100.00%
wage ratio ( Wtemp
Wnontemp
) 97.64% 100.00% 100.50% 100.00% 100.00%
total nontemp 103.63% 100.00% 99.21% 131.02% 91.19%
total temp 97.94% 100.00% 100.68% 119.76% 93.44%
total employment 103.51% 100.00% 99.24% 130.80% 91.24%
share of temp 94.62% 100.00% 101.45% 91.56% 102.42%
total output 104.99% 100.00% 98.16% 123.44% 92.53%
tax revenue 0.00% 100.00% 127.51% 0.00% 119.53%
total profit 109.29% 100.00% 95.75% 128.51% 90.72%
job destruction rate 183.12% 100.00% 81.85% 178.92% 81.72%
job creation rate 182.96% 100.00% 81.89% 178.76% 81.76%
average firm size 120.81% 100.00% 88.37% 150.85% 82.02%
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Note: Column 1, Column 3, Column 4 and Column 5 are in comparison to
Column 2.
and total employment (to 96.6% from 95.7%). Households substitute labor supply completely
to leisure in single-labor model, as in the illustration of reduction of total employment.
But in the dual-labor model, a lesser reduction of total employment represents a small
amount of substitution happening to temporary employment rather than entirely to leisure.
With the option of creating temporary jobs to avoid firing cost, JDR and JCR reduce by a
lesser amount in the dual model (54% tahn 41%). In summary, Table 6 presents evidence
that temporary employment provides households a small buffer to the reduction of market
activities from firms.
To summarize the exercises, I find that firing cost leads to misallocation of labor factor
in production, which results in a large efficiency loss. Firms sacrifice labor productivity by
becoming inactive and by hiring more temporary workers to avoid firing cost. Economy
with temporary employment reduces welfare loss for households in the event of increasing
firing cost. General equilibrium matters by including labor supply preferences of households,
which is reflected through price clearing.
5.2 Idiosyncratic risk and temporary employment
Comin and Philippon (2006) utilize an array of indicators to measure idiosyncratic volatil-
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Table 6: With and without temporary employment in the increase of firing cost
With temp Without temp
τ = 0 τ = 1w τ = 0 τ = 1w
nontemp wage 100.00% 93.02% 100.00% 91.36%
temp wage 100.00% 95.26%
total nontemp 100.00% 96.50% 100.00% 95.78%
total temp 100.00% 102.10%
total employment 100.00% 96.60% 100.00% 95.78%
total output 100.00% 95.25% 100.00% 93.92%
total profit 100.00% 91.50% 100.00% 88.42%
job destruction rate 100.00% 54.61% 100.00% 41.29%
job creation rate 100.00% 54.66% 100.00% 41.35%
average firm size 100.00% 82.77% 100.00% 85.19%
welfare 100.00% 96.51% 100.00% 95.26%
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Note: Column 2 is in comparison to Column 1; Column 4 is in
comparison to Column 3.
ity of firms in the last 50 years. They show that idiosyncratic volatility for firms about
doubled during the great moderation. In this exercise, I follow their empirical evidence and
double the idiosyncratic risk of firms in benchmark model and compare the response of firms
in having temporary employment.
Table 7 presents results of increasing idiosyncratic volatility in general equilibrium and
partial equilibrium. The first two columns exhibit changes in a frictionless environment.
Doubling idiosyncratic volatility directly leads to an increase in job turnover rate (to 109%
for both JDR and JCR). Higher idiosyncratic risk reflects in higher volatility in the firm’s
revenue and market share turnover (Comin and Philippon, 2006). Therefore, the firm needs
to adjust the labor stock more often in response to a more frequent change of idiosyncratic
shock. With the rigidity effect as described in previous subsection, the direction of change in
the rise of volatility compounds with the effect of firing cost reallocation. Partial equilibrium
results give similar information as partial equilibrium in Table 5.
Table 8 recollects results from frictionless dual market, benchmark model, and benchmark
model with doubled volatility. It gives a more direct perspective of the compound effect of
increasing firing cost and idiosyncratic volatility. From Column 2 to Column 3, increasing
volatility revitalize the labor market activities through increasing job turnover rates (from
54% to 77%) that was suppressed by motives of firing cost avoidance. Despite the decrease of
both wage rates, higher volatility increases the relative wage of temporary workers compared
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Table 7: Effect of doubling idiosyncratic volatility
General Equilibrium Partial Equilibrium
τ = 0 τ = 0.6w τ = 0.6w
σe = 0.259 σe = 0.3663 σe = 0.259 σe = 0.3663 σe = 0.3663
nontemp wage 100.00% 90.13% 100.00% 87.83% 100.00%
temp wage 100.00% 90.14% 100.00% 89.19% 100.00%
wage ratio ( Wtemp
Wnontemp
) 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 101.54% 100.00%
total nontemp 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 97.61% 63.88%
total temp 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.83% 66.96%
total employment 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 97.67% 63.94%
share of temp 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 103.23% 104.74%
total output 100.00% 90.13% 100.00% 89.18% 66.53%
tax revenue 100.00% 125.92% 94.96%
total profit 100.00% 90.14% 100.00% 90.25% 67.33%
job destruction rate 100.00% 109.87% 100.00% 141.16% 142.90%
job creation rate 100.00% 109.86% 100.00% 141.08% 142.88%
average firm size 100.00% 102.78% 100.00% 112.71% 70.58%
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Note: Column 2 is in comparison to Column 1; Column 4 is in comparison to Column 3; Column
5 is in comparison to Column 3.
18
to non-temporary workers on top of the existing effect from firing cost (from 102% to 104%).
The changes of employment level and of labor market composition (share of temp from 105%
to 109%) further demonstrate that firms use temporary employment as a buffer strategy.
With higher volatility, total non-temporary employment drops (from 96% to 94%). The
increase of temporary employment share almost doubles from having just firing cost. With
declining output and non-temporary employment, augmenting both firing cost and volatility
leads to a further punishment of consumer’s welfare (from 97% to 83%).
Table 8: Compound impact
τ = 0 τ = 0.6w τ = 0.6w
σe = 0.259 σe = 0.259 σe = 0.3663
nontemp wage 100.00% 93.02% 81.70%
temp wage 100.00% 95.26% 84.96%
wage ratio 100.00% 102.41% 103.99%
total nontemp 100.00% 96.50% 94.19%
total temp 100.00% 102.10% 102.94%
total employment 100.00% 96.60% 94.35%
share of temp 100.00% 105.69% 109.11%
total output 100.00% 95.25% 84.94%
total profit 100.00% 91.50% 82.57%
job destruction rate 100.00% 54.61% 77.09%
job creation rate 100.00% 54.66% 77.11%
average firm size 100.00% 82.77% 93.29%
welfare 100.00% 96.51% 82.66%
(1) (2) (3)
Note: Column 2 and Column 3 are in comparison to values in
Column 1.
As with before, I compare the dual labor model with a single labor model, in order to
separate the effect from having temporary employment. Table 9 presents the comparisons.
Column (5)-(8) show that the model with temporary employment responds to increasing
volatility in the environment of firing cost by a lesser reduction of wage rate (88% vs 86%),
employment (98% vs 97%), output (89% vs 87%) and welfare (86% vs 84%) than model with-
out temporary employment. Similar reason as before, firms can use temporary employment
as a buffer strategy in the event of high firing cost and high uncertainty; and households use
it as an option in the event of decreasing market activity. However, it shows an opposite
direction of the job turnover (141% vs 156%). In Table 6, the option of having tempo-
rary employment increases job turnover when firing cost hikes. But in the event of higher
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volatility, such increase in job turnover decreases compared to the single labor market. This
reflects the dominating effect from inaction band. As in Figure 3, economy with temporary
employment has a wider inaction band because of the intense use of temporary employment
as a buffer strategy. Though from single-labor model, a growing volatility exacerbates job
turnover, as a result of dominating effect from the constant need of changing production
factor over an opposite effect from fixed cost avoidance; by allowing the temporary workers,
the motive of fixed-cost avoidance increases.
In summary, from the exercise of changing idiosyncratic volatility, we further demonstrate
the use of temporary employment as a buffer strategy for firms. With the compound of firing
cost and increasing idiosyncratic volatility, firms show a stronger interest in using temporary
workers. Households can also benefit from having temporary employment opportunities by
having lesser reduction of utility when there is high market uncertainty.
6 Conclusion
Temporary employment has not been thoroughly studied in the literature. Quantitative
study in evaluating the role of temporary employment in the U.S. labor market has been
mostly empty, despite a growing importance in data. This paper contributes to quantita-
tive literature of labor market misallocation through a new lens of growing idiosyncratic
uncertainty for firms, in addition to simply raising labor market rigidities. Moreover, it con-
structed a simple Walrasian framework to fill the gap in literature and evaluate temporary
employment in the U.S. labor market.
In particular, I constructed a simple general equilibrium model with heterogeneous firms
that hire both temporary and non-temporary workers. By calibrating the model to the U.S.
economy, I found that increasing firing related cost distorts the allocation of labor factor.
I further introduce a raise of idiosyncratic risk to firms. Change of idiosyncratic risk alone
to a frictionless economy does not distort the allocation. It merely leads to a heightened
job turnover. By combining the two forces together, however, it generates a larger efficiency
loss. Idiosyncratic uncertainty amplifies the distortion from firing cost. Firms avoid paying
firing cost by creating an inaction band in their decision rule. Higher uncertainty enlarges
the inaction band. Comparing the model with and without temporary workers, firms utilize
temporary workers as a buffer strategy to avoid paying fixed cost. Firms sacrifice regular
employment to temporary employment. Thus, the size of inaction band increases further
with the introduction of temporary employment under friction. Though it offers firms a
chance to compensate inaction from adjusting only regular employment in a single labor
market, by allowing small adjustments to frictionless temporary employment; it does not
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Table 9: Effect of temporary employment in doubling volatility
τ = 0
with temp without temp
σe = 0.259 σe = 0.3663 σe = 0.259 σe = 0.3663
nontemp wage 100.00% 90.13% 100.00% 88.50%
temp wage 100.00% 90.14%
total nontemp 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
total temp 100.00% 100.00%
total employment 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
total output 100.00% 90.13% 100.00% 88.51%
total profit 100.00% 90.14% 100.00% 88.54%
job destruction rate 100.00% 109.87% 100.00% 109.98%
job creation rate 100.00% 109.86% 100.00% 109.96%
average firm size 100.00% 101.83% 100.00% 106.97%
welfare 100.00% 85.53% 100.00% 83.42%
(1) (2) (3) (4)
τ = 0.6w
with temp without temp
σe = 0.259 σe = 0.3663 σe = 0.259 σe = 0.3663
nontemp wage 100.00% 87.83% 100.00% 86.03%
temp wage 100.00% 89.19%
total nontemp 100.00% 97.61% 100.00% 97.09%
total temp 100.00% 100.83%
total employment 100.00% 97.67% 100.00% 97.09%
total output 100.00% 89.18% 100.00% 87.57%
total profit 100.00% 90.25% 100.00% 89.27%
job destruction rate 100.00% 141.16% 100.00% 156.62%
job creation rate 100.00% 141.08% 100.00% 156.56%
average firm size 100.00% 112.71% 100.00% 112.21%
welfare 100.00% 85.66% 100.00% 83.81%
(5) (6) (7) (8)
Note: Column 2 (6) is in comparison to Column 1 (5); Column 4 (8) is in
comparison to Column 3 (7).
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function as a reduction of fixed cost, and allowing temporary employment cannot recover
the efficiency loss from fixed cost and increased uncertainty. Despite so, having temporary
employment alleviates output loss, total employment loss, and households’ welfare cost in
the event of increasing firing cost and heightened uncertainty.
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